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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                   FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
 3
                            MARSHALL DIVISION
 4
    PERSONAL AUDIO, LLC
                                   ) (
 5
                                         CIVIL DOCKET NO.
                                   ) (
 6
                                   ) (
                                         2:13-CV-13-JRG-RSP
 7
   VS.
                                   ) ( MARSHALL, TEXAS
 8
                                   ) (
 9
    TOGI ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
                                   ) ( MAY 29, 2014
                                   )( 1:30 P.M.
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11
                             MOTION HEARING
12
                BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE ROY S. PAYNE
13
                     UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
14
15
   APPEARANCES:
16
   FOR THE PLAINTIFF: (See sign-in sheets docketed in
                        minutes of this hearing.)
17
18
   FOR THE DEFENDANT: (See sign-in sheets docketed in
                        minutes of this hearing.)
19
20
   COURT REPORTER:
                        Ms. Shelly Holmes, CSR-TCRR
                        Official Reporter
21
                        United States District Court
                        Eastern District of Texas
                        Marshall Division
22
                        100 E. Houston Street
23
                        Marshall, Texas 75670
                        (903) 923-7464
24
25
    (Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript
    produced on a CAT system.)
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             LAW CLERK: All rise.
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             THE COURT: Good afternoon. Please be seated.
 3
             For the record, we're here for the hearing on the
   motions to compel in the Personal Audio versus Togi
 4
    Entertainment matter, which is 2:13-13 on our docket.
 5
             Would counsel state their appearances for the record?
 6
 7
             MS. HENRY: Good morning, Your Honor -- good
 8
    afternoon, Your Honor. Claire Henry on behalf of Plaintiff.
    Along with me today are Jeremy Pitcock and Papool Chaudhari.
 9
10
    We're ready.
11
             THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Henry.
             MR. SMITH: Your Honor, Michael Smith for How Stuff
12
13
    Works. We also have Mr. Mark Reiter and Mr. Jason Lo, who will
14
   be presenting for us today. We're ready to proceed, Your
15
    Honor.
16
             THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Smith.
17
             MS. AINSWORTH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jennifer
18
    Ainsworth and Sharon Davis for CBS Corporation, NBC Universal,
19
    and the FOX Defendants.
20
             THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Ainsworth.
21
             MS. DAVIS: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
22
             THE COURT: I guess let me start off by hearing from
23
    Plaintiff on their -- on the first motion. We can take up
24
    the -- the motion regarding How Stuff Works first.
25
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
```

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1
             THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Chaudhari.
 2
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Just a housekeeping matter, Your
 3
    Honor.
             THE COURT: Yes.
 4
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Both of these motions are sealed --
 5
    the briefs are sealed in its entirety, and we think that in
 6
7
    compliance with the protective order, that the Defendants for
    the -- in the other -- in the other motion should be asked to
 8
    leave the courtroom and vice versa.
10
             THE COURT: Is there -- all right. Are you raising
    this out of concern for whether or not the Defendants'
11
12
    technology will be revealed from one to the other? In other
13
    words, is this an issue that's simply up to the Defendants
14
    or --
15
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Yeah, I mean -- I'm -- I'm happy to
16
    defer to the Defendants on it, but we -- but we may have AEO
    documents and be discussing AEO matters.
17
18
             THE COURT: Well, I quess I'll put it first to --
19
    Mr. Smith, to your side, is -- does -- since we're taking up
20
    your motion first or the motion regarding your client, do you
    want the counsel for the other Defendant to be out of the
21
22
    courtroom?
23
             MR. SMITH: No, we don't, Your Honor. We're fine with
24
    them being here for this motion.
25
             THE COURT: Okay. And, Ms. Ainsworth, Ms. Davis,
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1
    are -- what about y'all?
 2
             MS. AINSWORTH: That's fine with us, Your Honor.
 3
    There's only attorneys here, no client representatives today.
             THE COURT: Okay. Well, I appreciate you raising that
 4
    issue, Mr. Chaudhari, but we'll -- we'll go ahead and proceed.
 5
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Thank you, Your Honor.
 6
 7
             I think -- you know, before we get lost in the weeds
 8
    of this -- of this motion, I think there's just one -- I think
    there's one basic fact that we should really call to the
 9
10
    Court's attention, and that's that the technical 30 -- 30(b)(6)
    damages dep -- I'm sorry, the technical deposition for How
11
12
    Stuff Works, the 30(b)(6) dep -- 30(b)(6) deposition occurred
13
    on May 7th. It was scheduled for May 7th. Their damages
    deposition was scheduled for May 9th. And during the technical
14
15
    deposition on May 7th of Arensberg, it was clear to Plaintiff
16
    that he wasn't educated on the technical aspects of how audio
    podcasts were made available on the How Stuff Works website.
17
18
             And at that time, at that deposition, Mr. Lo here
19
    made -- you know, put it on the record their -- their position
20
    that they've set forth in their briefing in this motion.
21
    And -- and I was there, and I put on the record that we were
22
    going to file a motion to compel on this issue. And the very
23
    next day, we get a document produced by How Stuff Works, which
24
    I'll put on the ELMO here for the Court's convenience. Here's
25
    the first page of it.
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Perfect.

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And -- and what this document is, as confirmed by How Stuff Works's damages witness on the -- on the very next day, on May 9th, are -- is a document here that reflects the number of downloads of the audio podcasts that are made available on the How Stuff Works website.

Further, prior to that, How Stuff Works has always produced damages documents related to audio. In fact, one that was presented to Mr. Emmer is right here. You'll see here it says, accused divisions, and one of them here is non-video display, which Mr. Emmer confirmed referred to audio podcasts. So I think before we get into all the -- you know, what I call the weeds on this, it should be made very clear that How Stuff Works has produced damages discovery on audio. Therefore, I mean, there's really no reason that they shouldn't have produced technical discovery, as well.

If we go back to January 2013, that's when -- when Personal Audio filed its complaint against How Stuff Works. In its complaint, it alleged claim -- it alleged that How Stuff Works infringes Claim 31. Claim 31 is an apparatus claim that goes to the dissemination of media content. Or I'll use the words of Defendants in their -- in a letter brief that they have submitted to the Court for a motion for summary judgment. And they've referred to the claim as claiming devices that distribute content to a user upon request.

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             Well, I mean, whether that's audio or video, it makes
    no difference. I mean, the claim at issue is an apparatus
    claim for this device that distributes this content.
             Now, in July of 2013, the -- Personal Audio served
 4
    infringement contentions against How Stuff Works, and in those
 5
    infringement contentions, we specifically did say that we
 6
 7
    alleged that How Stuff Works infringes this apparatus claim.
 8
             Now, what we -- what we provided is we did provide
    examples of how the audio -- how video content was made
 9
    available on the website. We did not provide an example of how
11
    audio content is made available on the website.
12
             THE COURT: And why not?
13
             MR. CHAUDHARI: We didn't think it's necessary.
    don't even think that providing the example of video content
14
15
    was necessary.
             THE COURT: Were you aware -- did you hold the belief
16
    at that time that they were infringing in the -- in connection
17
    with their audio podcasts?
18
19
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Yes.
20
             THE COURT: And is there any reason why that belief
    wasn't reflected in your contentions?
21
22
             MR. CHAUDHARI: We didn't think that there was any
23
    need to reflect every single show or -- or podcast. I mean,
24
    let's --
25
             THE COURT: Did you amend your contentions as to NBC
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and CBS to include a contention regarding the audio podcasts? MR. CHAUDHARI: We did, Your Honor. THE COURT: Why did you do it in that -- with respect to that Defendant but not with respect to How Stuff Works? MR. CHAUDHARI: Frankly, you know, in a typical -- in a typical patent case, and you've got apparatus claims, and -and let me rephrase that. The accused -- although we -- although we have referred to video and audio content as accused products in the past, that is -- the only reason that we ever did that was to distinguish them from other aspects of these websites or webpages that have non -- that -- that have content that doesn't infringe the patent-in-suit. The patent is directed to -- to the apparatus claim. Now, the -- now, our concern at the time that we created the infringement contentions was damages, right? In a typical case, if you don't list all of your products, you may not be able to get damages on those products. But we listed those products, the products are the apparatuses. They're not the shows. They're not the audio shows. They're not the video shows. But why did we do it as to NBC and CBS? It was just an -- an abundance of caution, Your Honor. THE COURT: Why would you -- I guess I'm having a problem understanding you say that you -- the only reason you

didn't do it as to How Stuff Works was because it was

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unnecessary, but you did do it as to NBC and CBS. Why would
you feel it was necessary there but not necessary for this
Defendant?
        MR. CHAUDHARI: So one -- again, that we believe that
this was done in an abundance of caution related to -- to
damages, which ended up being -- becoming a non-issue as to How
Stuff Works because they've produced damages to -- discovery
related to audio.
        The other issue is that specifically as to How Stuff
Works, the shows -- the video shows that are listed in the
infringement contentions have a corresponding audio show.
        Now, that is -- that's distinguished from NBC and CBS
where the shows -- the audio shows that we added when we
amended those contentions were not ones that were related to
video programs that were previously set forth in the original
infringement contentions.
         THE COURT: Well, is it your position that How Stuff
Works infringes in connection with their video programming just
the same way as in their audio podcasts?
        MR. CHAUDHARI: Well, it's -- we contend that it's the
same apparatus. Now, you know, the -- the claim has different
elements to what that apparatus has and what it -- and what it
has to do, so there is a difference. The --
         THE COURT: Then why don't you need to cover that in
your infringement contentions?
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1
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Because the infringement contention --
   because the claim is an apparatus claim. The accused product
 2
    is the -- is the apparatus. It's not -- it's not how it's --
 3
    it's not -- it's not aspects of the How Stuff Works website,
 4
    and that's why -- like I said, we take the position that we
 5
    didn't even need to disclose video programs in the infringement
 6
7
    contentions, although we did.
             THE COURT: How is How Stuff Works to be on notice
 8
    that you are claiming that they infringe in connection with
 9
10
    their audio podcasts?
11
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Because in their words, the claim
12
    is -- it's for devices that distribute content to a user upon
13
    request.
             Now, I mean, the discovery order requires How Stuff
14
15
    Works and -- and all parties to produce all documents relevant
    to any claims and defenses. Our claim is that they infringe
16
17
    this claim that, as they put it, covers devices that distribute
18
    content to a user upon request.
19
             I -- I -- you know, we think it's unreasonable to read
20
    our infringement contentions as a -- as a limitation on the --
21
    on the content itself because content isn't accused in this
22
    case.
23
             THE COURT: And you're saying that the devices are the
24
    same? That everything that --
25
            MR. CHAUDHARI: Same or similar. I mean, they've
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1
    said -- you know, if -- I'm going to just elaborate guickly on
          The -- the technical -- the technical exp -- the
 2
 3
    technical witness on the May 7th deposition testified as to
    using Akamai servers to provide video content, and in the
 4
    opposition to the motion to compel, there's a declaration from
 5
    Noel Brown who says that they use Akamai servers to provide
 6
7
    the -- to put MP3 audio content on the How Stuff Works
 8
    website.
             THE COURT: Well, you've gotten the technical
 9
10
    discovery as to the video?
11
             MR. CHAUDHARI: That's correct.
12
             THE COURT: And why -- if -- if that's the same as the
13
    audio, then why do you need it again?
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Well, I -- I don't know that it's the
14
15
    same. I mean, I -- I mean --
16
             THE COURT: Aren't you telling me that it's the same,
    and that's why your infringement contentions apply to both?
17
18
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Well, I mean, I -- I don't know if
19
    it -- if -- I don't -- I don't know if it operates in exactly
20
    the same manner, or at least I didn't -- I didn't have any idea
21
    of that until -- until seeing the declarations that are in the
22
    opposition.
23
             THE COURT: But you -- you are saying that you knew
24
    about the audio podcasts of How Stuff Works at the time you
    filed your infringement contentions in August?
25
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1
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Yes.
 2
             THE COURT: You simply did not make any reference to
    the audio at that time?
 3
             MR. CHAUDHARI: That's correct.
 4
             THE COURT: So if the Court concludes that your
 5
    infringement contentions should have included that, there's no
 6
 7
    excuse for not having included it? It was available to you, it
 8
    was known to you?
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Well, we still maintain that we
    didn't have -- you know, if we had access to the servers --
10
11
             THE COURT: I understand.
12
             MR. CHAUDHARI: -- at the time -- at the time that we
13
    served our infringement contentions, that'd -- that'd be a
    whole different situation.
14
15
             THE COURT: But you're not contending that there was
    anything that you didn't know at that time about audio podcasts
16
17
    that prevented you from including that in your infringement
    contentions?
18
19
             MR. CHAUDHARI: That's correct.
20
             THE COURT: Okay. And tell -- give me the answer
21
    again just so I can understand clearly. You -- what is it that
22
    you contend put How Stuff Works on notice from your
23
    infringement contentions that the audio podcasts recovered -- I
24
   mean, and I guess I'm thinking about what the Defendants cited
25
    on the first page of their response brief.
```

1 MR. CHAUDHARI: Sure. 2 THE COURT: Document 161 where they quote from your 3 infringement contentions as saying only those shows currently available at the website are known to infringe at this time. 4 MR. CHAUDHARI: Yeah, that's a reference to shows that 5 either were made -- either -- either were made available 6 7 previously but aren't anymore or may be -- may be available in the future. 8 9 Looking at the infringement contentions, and that 10 would be Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, and I'm on Page 2, and it's Section 1, Subsection B, and we state in our infringement 11 12 contentions Claims 31 and 32 are infringed by an apparatus as 13 described in the PR 3-1(c) chart below. And in that chart --14 that was on -- I'm sorry, that was on Page 2. On Page 5, we 15 see the element that the -- the -- our contention corresponds to that -- that apparatus preamble, and we say, for example, 16 17 the webpages and associated data storage servers and 18 communication interfaces at howstuffworks.com are used to 19 disseminate a series of episodes represented by various 20 media files via communication interfaces connected to the 21 Internet. 22 THE COURT: And is there anything that makes reference 23 to the -- to the audio podcasts as opposed to the video? 24 MR. CHAUDHARI: No, there is not. 25 THE COURT: And in the -- in the Defendants' brief,

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they cite to a statement -- this is on the same page as you were referring to before -- that the currently available listing of series episodes which infringe can be found at -and then it lists a portion of their website that deals with videos. That would appear to me to be stating that the -- that the shows that you felt were infringing were videos. MR. CHAUDHARI: But -- but, again, shows only go to damages. I mean -- I mean, a show is not an accused product here because we're talking about a server side apparatus claim with dissemination of media content. I think that's the -that's the key here. The key confusion here is that we're -is that we are looking at videos and shows and -- and referring to them as accused products when the claim doesn't claim the shows. The claims a server apparatus that disseminates those shows. The shows go to damages only. THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. I think I interrupted your argument. So you can -- if there's other argument you want to provide on your motion, please go ahead. MR. CHAUDHARI: Yes, Your Honor. So just going forward in time after the service of the infringement contentions, we received How Stuff Works's Patent Local Rule 3-4 production, albeit a month late, but we did receive it. And the documentation there only related to video, but the discovery period in this case as to How Stuff Works opened in August and -- and closed on May 12th. Yet other than

1 their 3-4 production, we received no other documents until the last day for substantial completion of document production. 2 3 Had we received -- had we received a rolling production throughout the discovery period, we would have been able to 4 readily determine that -- that we weren't going to get anything 5 technical wise from them on audio and could have raised the 6 7 issue months ago. But even then, we still raised the issue -- as soon as 8 we did get that production on -- on March 31st, we recognized 9 10 the issue, we raised it, we went into the meet and confer, and our position is that we -- we resolved the issue, that we --11 12 that they told us they were going to give us technical 13 discovery on audio podcasts. And I understand that -- that that's not their position here today. But there's really no 14 15 need for the Court to get involved in a he-said/she-said 16 here. 17 But I think that the key takeaway is that we had -- we 18 had teed up a motion -- a meet and confer, we were on the verge 19 of filing a motion to compel. Had Defendant told us that they 20 weren't producing technical discovery on audio podcasts, we 21 would have filed our motion the next day. 22 THE COURT: Which would have been when? 23 MR. CHAUDHARI: So the meet and confer occurred on 24 April the 11th. That was a Friday, so we would have filed our 25 motion on April 14th.

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1
             THE COURT: Okay. About four weeks before it was
 2
    filed?
 3
             MR. CHAUDHARI: That's correct, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Okay.
 4
             MR. CHAUDHARI: So -- and, you know, all this goes to
 5
    this notion that we weren't diligent in bringing this issue to
 6
7
    the Court. Again, if -- if -- if we had gotten the document
 8
   production in the course of discovery, as we should have, we
    would have been able to tee this up months ago. Even -- even
10
    after receiving the document production on March 31st, we were
    ready to -- to file a motion on April 14th, but we -- but we
11
12
    had an in-person meet and confer and talked with them, and we
13
    left with the understanding that they were going to give us
14
    technical discovery on audio. After all, it's undisputed that
15
    the -- that the -- it's undisputed that they've produced
    damages discovery on audio, and then reiterated that at the
16
    meet and confer, as well.
17
18
             THE COURT: And is there anything in writing on that
19
    or are we just dealing with your impressions versus theirs from
20
    the discussions?
21
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Yeah, I believe it is our impressions
22
    versus theirs, which is why I have been saying, he-said,
23
    she-said. I don't think we have a -- we don't have a writing
24
    that memorializes the -- the minutes of the meet and confer.
25
             THE COURT: All right.
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1 MR. CHAUDHARI: And if I can just close this out. 2 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 3 MR. CHAUDHARI: You know, in -- in the opposition, we get these -- of Defendants provided detailed declarations from 4 Mr. Arensberg, their technical 30(b)(6) witness, and also Noel 5 Brown, and they go into really in depth discussion as to how 6 7 audio content is provided. And this was done on May 22nd. And 8 the Arensberg deposition took place on May 7th. Now, even -- even if you accept their position that 9 10 there's some -- even if you accept that there's any merit to Defendants' argument regarding audio, I mean, really all they 11 12 had to do here was provide some of this discovery back then, 13 couple weeks ago, instead of waiting until this motion was filed and then going into all this detail in the opposition. 14 15 I mean, after all, what they could have done is produce this stuff and -- and held a battle on the relevance at 16 17 a later time such as a motion in limine or motion to strike 18 portions of an expert report, but instead, because they've 19 taken this route, you know, it's -- it's really forced us to be 20 here today in a -- in what's a -- in -- in a disfavorable 21 motion to compel, because we know the Court doesn't favor 22 motions to compel. 23 I say that because I think our -- our central point is 24 that we're here because -- we're here because there's obviously a -- a misunderstanding between the parties as to what's 25

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    actually infringing in this case.
 2
             Two, the Defendant, you know, was not diligent in
 3
   producing documents. Had they been, we could have resolved
    this issue months ago.
 4
             And, three, instead of waiting until an opposition on
 5
    a motion to compel, they could have just given us this
 6
7
    discovery and fought over it later.
 8
             THE COURT: Are you suggesting that you now have the
    technical discovery that you were seeking?
 9
10
             MR. CHAUDHARI: I'm suggesting that the declarations
11
    are a component of it.
12
             THE COURT: Okay. But they're not -- they don't
13
    satisfy your -- what you think you need?
14
             MR. CHAUDHARI: That's correct.
15
             THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you,
   Mr. Chaudhari.
16
17
             MR. LO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jason Lo for How
    Stuff Works.
18
19
             I want to start with the last point, Your Honor, was
20
    asking about which was the diligence that the Plaintiff engaged
21
    in in raising up this issue. And throughout the papers,
22
    Plaintiff has said we only made one production, and we made our
23
    3-4 production late. That is factually incorrect. As we
24
    raised in our brief and as we noted -- and it's in Exhibit 6,
25
    which is -- which are our invalidity contentions -- we told the
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    Plaintiff on October 10th, the day we were supposed to, that we
    had gathered source code and that it was available for
 2
 3
    inspection. That is not in dispute.
             And with the Court's permission, I want to hand up
 4
    another document because usually in these cases when we tell
 5
    the Plaintiff that we've got source code for inspection, they
 6
7
    come right away and they say, you know, we want to schedule a
 8
    time, and we want to look at your source code.
             We actually never heard back from the Plaintiff, and
10
    so after a series of correspondence -- and this is what I want
11
    to hand up to the Court, if I may -- on October 30th, my
12
    colleague sent to the Plaintiff a letter saying, we said in our
13
    invalidity contentions, we have source code available for
14
    inspection. Please let us know when you want to come to look
15
    at it.
             And so with the Court's permission, I will hand this
16
17
    up.
18
             THE COURT: All right.
19
             MR. LO: We got no response on that letter, no request
20
    to inspect the source code. And, in fact, the source code
21
    inspection never happened until May of this year, four days
22
   before they filed this motion. So that source code has been
23
    sitting around since October of 2013. We wrote a follow-up
24
    letter inviting them to come to inspect it. They never did so.
25
    And had they done so, they probably would have been on notice
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1 that this was an issue, and they would have raised this issue earlier. 2 3 In their briefs, they also say we did our 3-4 production late, and they make a reference to this November 4 19th production. That is inaccurate. The November 19th 5 production was something that was in addition to our 3-4 6 7 production. Our 3-4 production was always the source code that 8 was sitting there available for inspection. And then in November, we produced approximately six or 7,000 more pages of 10 documents. In both sets of documents, had they bothered to look at them, they would have seen only video materials on the 11 12 technical side. They would not have seen anything on audio. 13 They put --THE COURT: Mr. Lo, one thing, do you disagree with 14 15 their statement that you made damages disclosures regarding 16 audio? 17 MR. LO: Yes, in the way it is framed in that sense, 18 Your Honor. We provided -- and -- and this is a good example 19 of the document that is on the -- on the projector right now. 20 The way the company works is it -- it provides company wide pro 21 forma statements, and How Stuff Works has a lot of things that 22 are not relevant in this case. And so let's put aside audio 23 for a second. 24 One of the things that the company puts on the How Stuff Works website are just articles that you can go on and 25

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read. There's no audio content. There's no video content.
Even the advertising revenue from those are included just in
the ordinary course of business in our normal financial
statements. And so the reason we provided not only the audio
income data but also income data from, for example, non-video,
from Google ads and things like that was because our damages
expert ultimately would have needed a way to back out of that
information. And as Your Honor knows, if the company keeps a
document in its ordinary course of business and they give it to
me to produce to the other side, I can't just take a black
marker and say, you know, I don't think audio is in the case,
I'm going to redact this. I'm not going to give it to you.
         We gave them the documents as they are kept -- the
numbers as they are kept by the company, and then we also tried
to gather additional audio stuff and additional Google stuff,
additional non-display stuff so that ultimately our expert
would have a basis to say here are the overall numbers and
here's how I'm backing it out so that I can figure out what
portion is attributable to video.
         THE COURT: All right. And you mentioned that if --
if the Plaintiff had examined your source code earlier on, they
would have been aware of this -- of this issue.
         MR. LO: Yes.
         THE COURT: Tell me about that. How would they have
been aware?
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Because the video -- and we -- we put this in MR. LO: the declaration. So, for example, one major difference -- and this part is publicly accessible. The videos are served using a totally different computer language, HTML, and it's the language that we all -- we don't see, but we interact with when we browse CNN.com or something like that. So when they looked at the source code, they would know that it's all the HTML stuff is in there. All of the audio that they pointed to is in a different language and interacts with a totally different kind of server. And, in fact, if Your Honor just used a web browser to go to one of these RSS XML pages, unless somebody had previously installed an additional software on top of it, that browser wouldn't be able to read that. So if you look at the source code and you simply look at -- at a very high level, what language is at issue, you would know. There -- there's obviously better ways to know. once you dig into it, you would also know that the content there is different, but just that they -- even if one is not a computer science expert, just looking at the different programming languages, you would know that there are no XML or -- or RSS materials in there. THE COURT: All right. The -- I won't belabor the point in terms of the notice as -- as Personal Audio concedes, they did not mention anything about the audio podcasts. And as counsel

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concedes, there are differences between the audio and the video. They've now seen our declarations. They do not contend right now that they are done on the -- that they distributed in the same way because there are differences in terms of machinery. There are differences in terms of the personnel who do the video versus audio. There are differences in terms of the work flow that happens from beginning to end. All of those differences are laid out, and they don't really go through -and they should have done this in their opening brief on an element-by-element basis, tell the Court how they are reasonably similar. Under Honeywell, that's what you've got to do when you're coding them to do so. And actually I should pause there. As the Court started the conversation with Mr. Chaudhari, you don't even get to the reasonably similar analysis because there's no dispute that these audio pages were available at the time they did the contentions. Personal Audio has now said they were aware of them. They thought they infringed. And under the local rules and under Honeywell and Orion, when something is publicly available, you have to put those in your contentions. There's simply no excuse. And it's telling that throughout their briefing, they refer to these as their preliminary infringement contentions. Well, that preliminary portion went out the door about six or

seven years ago, and the rules have changed, and those are not preliminary contentions. Those are contentions which under AEG, the Plaintiff has to exercise due diligence by looking at all publicly available information in order to -- in order to form their contentions, and they've not done that. They concede that. And that in itself ends the inquiry. You never even get to the reasonable similarity, nor -- nor do you get to the -- nor do you get to the diligence analysis.

The last thing I want to point out in terms of the differences -- and this is -- again, we can tell just by looking at the infringement contentions that they amended for

differences -- and this is -- again, we can tell just by looking at the infringement contentions that they amended for CBS and for NBC. The Court has already pointed out that they put in different claim charts for the audio versus video. So even under their own analysis, their -- they didn't just say, everything infringes for the same reason. They did a separate claim chart when they did their contentions for audio and they amended it. That's Point No. 1.

Point No. 2 is if the Court takes a look at their contentions for video versus audio, the Court will notice that there are different claims asserted between the two sections. So, for example, in the video, they assert claims -- additional Claims 33 and 34, and those claims are not asserted when it comes to what they call the podcasting video, which is, I think, their shorthand for audio media. I'm not close enough with the -- how the things work behind -- behind the scene for

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CBS or NBC to know exactly why. But just on the face of these
contentions, that is another indicia that there is a
substantial difference such that they chose not to assert two
out of the four claims when it came to the audio.
         THE COURT: All right.
        MR. LO: So unless the Court has any additional
questions, I'm prepared to rest.
         THE COURT: I don't think so, Mr. Lo. Thank you.
        MR. LO: Thank you.
         THE COURT: Mr. Chaudhari, if you want to respond?
        MR. CHAUDHARI: I'll keep this brief.
         I led off our discussion here today discussing this
document that was produced on the day between the technical
30(b)(6) witness and the damages 30(b)(6) witness for How Stuff
Works. The day after Mr. Lo went on the record on -- on his
position and -- and also the day after I -- I went on the
record and said we're going to file this motion.
        Now, as we discussed earlier, this is a document that
shows the number of downloads of audio podcasts broken out by
podcast in the relevant -- in the relevant infringing time
period.
        Now, nowhere in the brief or -- or in Defendants'
argument here today did they address this document. They don't
address this document because this document is a concession
from Defendant that audio belongs in this case, the day
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after -- the day after they said the technical documents on audio aren't in this case. There's no technical -- you know, the day after they said that audio is not in this case. The day after I said, I'm going to -- that we're going to file a motion to compel to get audio discovery, they give us a document that -- that sets forth the number of downloads of audio podcasts on the How Stuff Works website. THE COURT: Well --MR. CHAUDHARI: There's no reason to produce that unless you concede that audio is a part of this case. THE COURT: Mr. Chaudhari, Mr. Lo indicated that they produced damages discovery globally and then separately for audio and other non-video damages elements so that their expert could isolate the revenue relating to video alone. Is -- why would this not be consistent with that? MR. CHAUDHARI: What I'm suggesting is that this having been produced on May 8th, the day after Mr. Lo went on the record saying audio is not in this case, the day after I said that we're going to file a motion to compel on audio, the day after that, they produced this document. That only goes to audio and only goes to downloads. They didn't produce this back on March 31 on their -- on the deadline for substantial completion or -- or at any other time in the -- in the relevant discovery period. They produced it the day after they said that audio is not in the case and the day after I said I was

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    going to file a motion to compel.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. CHAUDHARI: As to the -- and I just wanted to --
    just a housekeeping point. On the -- on this issue about the
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    3-4 production, we don't dispute that they said in their
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    invalidity contentions that they were making source code
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    available, but our understanding is that the 6,000 pages that
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    we did receive in November of 2013 was a part of their 3-4
   production. And although we don't have the correspondence here
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   before you today, we -- we -- we have always maintained that
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   position.
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             THE COURT: What do you say in response to what Mr. Lo
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    said about your CBS-NBC amended contentions where when you
    included audio, you provided separate charts and also relied on
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    different claims?
             MR. CHAUDHARI: That's right. Well, as to video as to
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    NBC, CBS, and FOX, we do assert Claims 31, 32, 33, and 34. As
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    to How Stuff Works in its entirety, we've only asserted --
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    we've only asserted Claims 31 and 32.
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             THE COURT: So you're saying that if you were to amend
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    with respect to audio regarding How Stuff Works, you would not
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    do what you did with CBS and NBC?
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             MR. CHAUDHARI: We would not be adding Claims 33 and
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    34.
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             THE COURT: All right. And would you rely upon any
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different element-by-element analysis of the infringement
concerning audio, as opposed to that which you've done
regarding video for How Stuff Works?
        MR. CHAUDHARI: We would -- we would point to -- we
would point to what we assert as the compilation file, which
is a -- it's -- as Mr. Lo says, it's -- I believe it's an XML
file versus an HTML file, but it's also available on the How
Stuff Works website. But, yeah, we would -- it would be
essentially the same, except for pointing to these different
webpages that are -- that are -- that are on the same site.
        THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chaudhari.
         I'd like to move to the other motion at this time.
        Mr. Pitcock.
        MR. PITCOCK: Yes, Your Honor. Good afternoon.
         I -- there's a fundamental difference in the motion to
compel against the network Defendants in that the main part of
the dispute, at least on the technical side, is whether or not
we were entitled to discovery on what are known as native
mobile applications.
         Unlike websites, which send an HTML file publicly to
the browser and which you can analyze, native applications are
written in machine code, and it is impossible to tell how they
work absent discovery. So there -- there was no way at the
time we filed our preliminary infringement contentions that we
could have accused these products, the native mobile apps, of
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infringement.

So what we did in our -- in our local rules is we tried to be as broad as possible in our -- in our infringement contentions, and particularly at 3-1(a), this is an exhibit -- Exhibit 1 to our opening brief. On all of these, we say Personal Audio presently contends that Defendant infringes asserted Claims 31 through 34 directly by video media disseminated by the network Defendant. Further, to the extent that discovery shows that Defendant utilizes third-party computers to host the accused instrumentality, including at least the accused websites, such hosting would necessarily be at the direction and control of the Defendants.

So we always contemplated that there may be other websites that we were unaware of that were controlled by the Defendants, and we always contended that it was possible that they were using the same apparatus to infringe in a different way. But there was no way at the time we filed our infringement contentions or really there's no way without discovery that we could ever have in good faith said, yes, they have a compilation file, here's what it is, and it comes over -- comes over the -- the wire in response to a client device request. So that's the first point.

The second point is, you know, that there -- there's some discussion about, you know, whether we should have realized, based on their source code production, you know, what

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they were and were not putting into the case. With respect to the network Defendants, they -- you know, we were hoping to focus our technical expert -- I mean, there are millions of lines of code to potentially analyze. It makes no sense to send an expert, you know, across the country to go look at a computer for days on end without some of the supporting technical documentation that we only received in part on March 30th. There was no reason -- and when we did go to inspect the network Defendants' source code, they hadn't even produced all the source code relevant to the accused websites. In fact, they had -- despite their description of them, had not produced source code for any of the server side stuff, which we asked for and we had to have our expert go back and inspect again so that we could, you know, look at the right code for the various websites. So, you know, Ms. -- I shouldn't personalize it, but the Defendants in their opposition, you know, they point to -they point to, you know, an article about the Defendants' native mobile apps. There's nothing in this article that indicates whether or not, you know, particular compilation files relating to episodes are sent to the requesting client There's no way to know that information absent discovery. When they failed to produce much in the way of documentation on March 30th, we sent a letter. Our request -we requested specific categories of documents which was set

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    forth in the reply brief. We specifically asked for, you know,
    documents that would be broad enough to cover any request for
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   media disseminated over the Internet in a few different
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    categories. And then when we had our meet and confer, they at
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    no time said, okay, well, we're only going to give you this,
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   but we're not going to give you anything else, or we would have
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    known to bring our motion to compel at that time. We were just
    left in the position of -- they didn't even give us deadlines
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    for their production. As we received documents, it became more
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    and more clear.
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             And then, finally, at the technical depositions of the
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    witnesses, which occurred mostly in the week right before the
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    end of fact discovery because we weren't able to take them any
    earlier from lack of documentation, at that time, it -- that's
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    when they said, okay, well, even though you asked for a
    30(b)(6) topic on native mobile apps and how they work, we're
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    not going to -- you know, we're just not going to produce a
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    witness on that topic.
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             THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Pitcock.
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             MR. PITCOCK: Oh, I'm sorry -- I'm sorry, Your Honor,
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    there -- there is a second part of the brief which was on
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    advertising. I -- I apologize.
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             And so looking at their reply brief, there's -- there
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    was also advertising information. If you look at that same
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    correspondence, we asked for a lot of information related to
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advertising, and that was also not produced, although at the
meet and confer, it was our understanding that they were going
to produce those materials. And, again, it wasn't until the
late depositions that it became apparent that they had not
produced all the relevant documentation.
        THE COURT: Thank you.
        MS. DAVIS: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Davis.
        MS. DAVIS: Let me start, I think, with the issue of
the Plaintiff's disclosures in their infringement contentions.
        As is the case with respect to the argument that you
heard earlier, there's nothing in Plaintiff's infringement
contentions that makes reference to native mobile apps. And
you didn't hear -- Mr. Pitcock indicated that -- that in order
to know whether or not the native mobile apps infringe, that
somehow his contention is that he needed discovery to know
that. But at no point either in the infringement contentions
or during the entire factual discovery period where we were
discussing documents, at no point did any of the counsel for
Personal Audio ever raise the issue of native mobile
applications being an accused product in this case.
        At no point -- and we went through this in detail in
the briefing, Your Honor. At no point -- first of all, as I
said in the infringement contentions -- and if you look at Page
3, for example, of the FOX infringement contentions, which is,
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1 I think, what Mr. Pitcock pointed to, it's very clear it's referring to websites, explicitly, multiple times. Only those 2 shows at websites believed to be upon information and belief 3 under the direction and -- and control of FOX are listed below. 4 However, other websites under control of the Defendants may be 5 shows through discovery to infringe. 6 7 The only way you can understand these infringement 8 contentions is that they were accusing the FOX -- in this case, FOX.com website and these servers related to the delivery of 9 10 that website as being the infringing apparatus. That's what they said repeatedly in their infringement contentions and as 11 12 we'll look at -- at the correspondence that was relating to 13 fact discovery here. We also pointed out that in their -- in their list of 14 15 accused products, they refer to the example compilation HTML file that they're identifying. And as Mr. Pitcock himself 16 17 admits, native mobile apps don't -- don't have HTML files that 18 would fall and be this type of file. 19 When we get to the podcasts, they identified the XML 20 files that are related to the delivery of those files as being 21 the alleged infringed compilation file. There's no way that we 22 could take from that an understanding that they were also 23 accusing a totally separate type of technology that is in a

different computer language that is downloaded to a device

rather than being a system that uses a browser that is --

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uses -- just uses a different player. We're talking about totally separate technologies here that they're now seeking to add to the case this entirely new technology. And you already heard from Mr. Pitcock that he can't even -- even now say whether or not the native mobile apps infringe or don't infringe, which shows you that it's not just a matter of looking at a few servers. There is different technology, and the claims require the use of a compilation file. That compilation file is a file that has to get sent to the user's device. It has certain characteristics that are required by the claim. That has nothing to do with what type of server you're using. That has to do with a mechanism by which the video is delivered on that particular kind of system, and that's entirely different for the apps as -- than it would be for the websites. And really, what they're asking for -- I mean, I think would require -- it would require us to revisit technical documents. It would require new source code, new witnesses, and presumably they would want new expert reports at this stage of the game. THE COURT: Ms. Davis, tell me, do you contend that anything that occurred during the discovery would have put them on notice that you are taking the position that native mobile apps were not accused here?

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MS. DAVIS: The first time, Your Honor, that -- that the issue of native mobile apps was ever raised by Plaintiff was in their 30(b)(6) notice, and we did respond to their 30(b)(6) notice by objecting on the grounds that native mobile apps had not been identified in the preliminary infringement contentions and that we would provide witnesses with respect to products that were identified in the preliminary infringement contentions.

If you look at the correspondence, Your Honor, in fact -- and -- and there's been a lot of discussion about the meet and confer. Let me be clear because I was in the meet and confer. We did it right here at this table. At no point during the meet and confer did Personal Audio ever say, we would like discovery about mobile apps. At no point were those words used. They're not in the letter. They're not in my responsive letter. And, in fact, you can tell from my responsive letter, which is at -- at Exhibit 9, you can tell that what we were talking about, that we did not include mobile apps.

In fact, as I -- if you look at my letter at Page 3, this was right before the meet and confer, so this was the -they had sent a letter with a list of requests. And we were providing a detailed response pursuant to Paragraph 9 of the discovery order. And what we said is with respect to technical documents, as we discussed in our telephone conversation,

because Plaintiff's counsel and I had a conversation about
where we were on the document issues in advance of this letter
and the meet and confer. I said, we remain unclear as to what
kinds of documentation Personal Audio lacks that would be
relevant to the claims or defenses in this case. We felt like
at this point and -- and then we discussed it further in the
meet and confer, we felt like we had already produced technical
documents. We were asking, you know, hey, what is it that
you -- that you think you don't have? And they had made a
distinction between design and operation. We were asking about
that. And then there were specific topics that we responded to
as to the status of those.

It's telling -- a couple of things, Your Honor. With
respect to one of the categories that Plaintiffs cite at the

It's telling -- a couple of things, Your Honor. With respect to one of the categories that Plaintiffs cite at the beginning of their reply brief, and they say, oh, we should have realized from looking at those categories that they meant to include mobile apps. Well, in my letter with respect to Category G, which is one of those topics, I said, we have produced documents showing this information. If there is additional material that you want and have not received, please let us know. Okay? So we were saying, we think we've produced everything on this topic. They didn't come back to us and say, oh, yes, but you haven't produced that stuff on mobile apps to us. They didn't come back and say that.

When we went to the meet and confer, there were

specific topics that we talked about. None of them involved 1 anything to do with mobile apps. And we resolved all of the 2 3 outstanding issues by agreeing what we were and were not going to produce. It was mostly honestly in the damages area. On 4 the technical side, we had offered source code for 5 production -- for inspection, and we had produced a lot of 6 7 documents. I also want to point out with respect to the 8 correspondence that in the reply brief, Plaintiff suggests that 9 10 we should have realized that they were including mobile apps because there were some categories that they -- the ones they 11 12 list in their brief that they say are broader, and then there 13 were other categories that were limited to the accused website. 14 Two points on that, Your Honor. First is in my letter 15 of April 17th, Exhibit 9, on Page 4, I actually specifically 16 add -- address something related to that issue. When we got to 17 those -- those last K through R topics, I said, in our phone 18 conference, you indicated that these requests were duplicative 19 of A through J, because that was the conversation we had. They 20 sort of had a very long list. It was A through R of technical 21 documents that they were asking about. None of those, of 22 course, included the words "app," "mobile app," "native mobile 23 app." That was not in there.

But they had this A through R list, and so when we

were going through them, it kind of got -- it got repetitive,

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and I said, oh, are these just duplicative -- and just kind of phrased it a little different way, and they said, yes. And so that's in my letter. We had -- and the second thing is that even the categories that they mention, Your Honor, that they include in their reply brief, all of those -- those A, B, C, F, and G, even in those, most of them actually do refer, once again, to the cite or the page. If you look at, for example, F, delivery of advertisements on the site or page. Category C, content such as advertising on the site or page. All of their references were always throughout the case, throughout the correspondence, they were always talking to us in terms of the webpages and websites that they contended infringe. In fact, their letter itself, the -- the letter that they sent on -- on April 3rd, the detailed letter, specifically says in the -- on the first page, it says, the accused websites are accused to infringe. And then goes on. They -- the message -- the only thing we can take from their contentions and from all of the correspondence throughout this, even after the meet and confer on April 24th, was that they were accusing websites of infringing. And that's what they were seeking discovery on. At no point did they raise the issue of native mobile apps. Under this Court's laws, we've already talked about in

the earlier argument, Your Honor -- first of all, there's

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really no dispute that the native apps were known to Personal Audio. There's no secret that you can go to iTunes and look for NBC, CBS, and FOX and find the existence of these apps. Now, I guess Plaintiff's argument is that, yeah, we maybe knew about them, but we didn't know whether or not they infringe, so you are supposed to, I quess, you know, read our mind and know that we were also wondering if those might infringe. But they certainly didn't do anything to put us on notice of that. So under the law, they were responsible for putting those in their infringement contentions or certainly at least doing something -- if they felt like they didn't have enough information, certainly doing something to put us on notice of that publicly accessible accused infringing product before the very end of fact discovery in the case. And if we get into the whole issue of reasonable similarity a little bit, they can't possibly meet the reasonable similarity test even just based on what they've admitted, Your Honor. It's clear that the products -- the -the native mobile applications, everyone admits, I think they don't dispute, are written in a different computer language, function differently, do not use the same kind of compilation

file at all. They don't even have the same type of -- of language as any of the other accused products. They just

simply do not function the same.

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The most that they've been able to say is essentially there are some servers which may be somewhat similar types of servers that play some limited role in this process. That's the most they've been able to say. And, in fact, in their reply brief, they point to testimony of some of the NBC and CBS and FOX witnesses, and I don't want to get too far into the technicalities because I don't think we need to do that here, but the discussion that they have about how the native mobile applications interact with servers at the platform, which is a -- a con -- a contractor, someone who does -- who operates video content management systems, that conversation relates to servers that are not even the servers that are involved in the infringement chart that they provided for the video on the websites. That's a totally different set of servers, so to speak, than what is listed in the -- what is identified in the infringement contentions that serves the compilation files that are identified in the infringement contentions.

So really -- I mean, they're similar only in the sense that there might be servers involved in both. And that certainly is not sufficient to meet the reasonably similar standard under this Court's precedent.

THE COURT: Give me your response on the advertising.

MS. DAVIS: Oh, certainly, Your Honor. On the -- on the advertising, I thought -- as I indicated in our opposition

brief -- well, let me step back for a moment. This is another issue where from our perspective, it was not clearly raised in what they had asked for.

What they had asked for and -- and indicated to us that they were looking for was customer -- customer relations promotion advertising, like they were looking for things where we put on a commercial or something like that that said you can download episodes at FOX.com. And that's what they had asked for, and we had had conversations around that.

Subsequent to that, during the depositions, it became clear that they were looking for something different which was they were looking for documents that showed how the networks approached potential advertisers or advertising agencies to promote the idea of advertising on the videos on websites.

In response to that, we agreed to investigate. They made that request during the deposition process. We agreed to investigate. And as I told -- I indicated in my opposition brief and I told counsel in our meet and confer, what we have been -- what we have been able to -- what we have gotten and gathered and are willing to produce are the -- sort of template or what they have is they have slide decks that they use for this and they have been able to collect that provide the information I believe that Plaintiffs want. And I think we agreed, and Plaintiffs can tell me if I'm wrong, but Mr. Chaudhari was on the call where we talked about it, that

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they were fine with getting these sort of template or the
generalized slide decks, rather than demanding that we go back
and pull every version that might have been used over that
couple of year period because these are things where like, you
know, if they're making a presentation on Tuesday, they would
put in a new coverage page, et cetera.
         THE COURT: Have you produced those?
         MS. DAVIS: I haven't produced them. As I told them
yesterday, they're ready to go. I mean, I can produce them in
a day.
         The issue -- the issue that they were going to
identify for us whether there were other identifiable types of
documents that they were looking for, and -- and essentially we
talked about it. I thought we had more or less reached an
agreement or thought that we -- that when they got the slide
decks, that we could probably -- if there's anything else
specific that they wanted, that we could work out a -- a scope
of production on that.
         So I don't think we have an ongoing dispute, but --
but I can let -- Plaintiff can -- can clarify their position on
that if they want to.
         THE COURT: What are you waiting for to make that
production?
         MS. DAVIS: I was just waiting to understand from them
is -- is that what they want. We talked about it yesterday
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afternoon, so it just hasn't -- it's literally like, you know,
pushing -- you know, putting it through the Bates numbering
process and -- and pushing a button.
         THE COURT: All right.
         MS. DAVIS: They're good to go.
         THE COURT: Thank you.
         Mr. Pitcock, do you want to respond?
         MR. PITCOCK: I just wanted to point out, Your Honor,
that I think it's pretty clear that we were looking for
information about the use of the Internet to disseminate video
media, whether it was in a native mobile app or otherwise.
the 30(b)(6) topics that we served on April 2nd, long before
the meet and confer, we also asked for broad categories of
discovery. And they're -- they're relevant not only to the
issue of do these native apps infringe, which we could not --
she's -- she's pointing to nothing that would allow us to have
used public information to accuse them of infringement at the
time we filed our infringement contentions, is, you know, they
are potential non-infringing substitutes if, in fact, they
don't infringe.
         These native apps are written specifically in part for
Apple, and so one of their potential defenses is, you know, we
are, you know, precluded from getting any damages against
licensed Apple devices. And so all this information -- I
believe it was very clear that we were seeking information rog
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    in our 30(b)(6) requests and in our conversations --
 2
             THE COURT: When's the first time you believe that you
 3
    used the term or some similar term, the native mobile apps, in
    connection with your requests for discovery and disclosure?
 4
             MR. PITCOCK: I mean, I know they objected -- I -- I
 5
    can't remember, Your Honor, and I'll be happy to supplement the
 6
7
    record and -- and find this out. There's been a great deal of
 8
    correspondence between the parties.
             THE COURT: Was it in connection with the 30(b)(6)
 9
10
    deposition?
11
             MR. PITCOCK: Well, I believe they objected and said
12
    that they weren't going to produce anybody on native mobile
13
    apps even though they didn't move for protective order. So my
    understanding is they waived that objection.
14
15
             So at least by that time, before we took the technical
    30(b)(6) depositions, they were aware that we wanted that
16
17
    specific information enough to object to producing a witness on
    those grounds.
18
19
             I think it's pretty clear that it would fall, you
20
    know, under some of the categories that were -- we did not use
21
    the exact phrase "native applications," but, you know, we asked
22
    for Topic 17, the design and operation and method of use of all
23
    communication interfaces connected to the Internet for
24
    receiving requests received from remotely located client
25
    devices and for responding to such requests.
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Again, you know, we did not -- we cannot know, absent
discovery, whether these applications infringe the compilation
file limitation in the patent-in-suit.
         THE COURT: Well, did you know you were looking at
that issue? Was that something that was in your mind back
before they first objected to it?
         MR. PITCOCK: Yes. I mean, when -- when -- when they,
you know, didn't give us much in the way of documentation, and
there was no way -- they gave us so little, there was really no
way to sort of discern, you know, what were they just not
producing at all? What were they going to produce a little
later? What did they need clarification on and what we wanted?
I mean, it was just a handful of documents for most of these
network Defendants.
         And so when we went through there, they asked us, you
know, give us a category of everything that you want. We wrote
out a letter, and we -- we said, you know, we want all these
broad categories of documents, including the ones in the reply
brief, and this certainly would have been responsive. There
were lots of specific technologies that I did not name in
particular that I would have thought were responsive to those
requests.
         THE COURT: Why -- why not?
         MR. PITCOCK: I -- I didn't -- I mean, maybe I made a
mistake, and I'd be willing to admit it. I just -- I always
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thought with infringement contentions, you were only supposed
    to put in the things that you had a good faith basis to believe
    were infringing at the time, but if you had a good faith basis
    for believing that a Defendant infringed a claim of a patent,
    that you could get discovery on other instrumentalities used to
   perform similar or the same functions.
 6
 7
             THE COURT: I just am wondering why you wouldn't
    identify native mobile apps. If it's in your head and you
    don't know if it's in their head, why not say it?
 9
10
             MR. PITCOCK: Well, I suppose -- you know, again,
11
    we -- we were at the end of discovery. We needed to take
    depositions. I suppose I could have been even more detailed
13
    than the multi-page letter and all the different deficiencies,
    but really, at that point, it was kind of like serving document
15
    requests after the substantial compliance date. I mean, I
    wasn't looking to be incredibly specific because I didn't have
16
17
    any information with which to narrow my request. I was
18
    looking for broad discovery on relevant documentation, which I
19
    believe they should have already produced under the standing
    order.
21
             THE COURT: All right. Talk about Ms. Davis's remarks
22
    about the advertising documents.
23
             MR. PITCOCK: I was -- I was not on that call, Your
24
    Honor, so if you don't mind, I'm going to defer to
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   Mr. Chaudhari.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. CHAUDHARI: Just really quickly, we -- we
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    definitely want the documents that Ms. Davis referred to, but
    we still think there's a whole host of other -- at least we --
 4
    there may be a whole host of other documents that relate to the
 5
    Defendants promoting their advertising.
 6
 7
             THE COURT: And have you made known to Ms. Davis what
    you think those other documents would include?
 8
             MR. CHAUDHARI: Yeah, we -- we discussed this on -- on
 9
10
    the meet and confer yesterday, documents that -- that tout --
11
    documents to potential advertisers that, you know, tout the --
12
    tout their functionality, tout the ability to -- to -- to
13
    advertise on their show. We -- we -- that's -- we think that
14
    information is highly relevant to -- to damages in this case.
15
             THE COURT: And tell me how you would intend to use
16
    that for damages.
             MR. CHAUDHARI: I mean, it goes to the -- it goes to
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18
    commercial success of the -- of the -- of the Defendants' use
19
    of the -- of the infringing devices.
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             THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
21
             MS. DAVIS: Your Honor, I just want to -- I want to
22
    clarify one thing because I think I may have misspoken a bit.
23
             With -- with respect to the 30(b)(6) notice, just to
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    be -- just to be clear, because I think I might have left a
25
    misimpression that we specifically recognized at that point
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1
    that -- that they were asking for native mobile apps and made
    an objection on that basis, and I -- I misremembered the
 2
 3
    record, and I apologize for that.
             The -- even in the 30(b)(6) notice, they
 4
    specifically -- they describe accused websites, and they define
 5
    accused websites by reference to the specific sites that they
 6
7
    had indicated in their infringement contentions, and then they
    added language that said, and any other website that has these
 8
    characteristics. And so we objected in our objections, and
 9
10
    said -- said nothing about mobile apps, and it said nothing
    about mobile apps in the request which are all -- refer to the
11
12
    accused websites.
13
             What we objected to was we objected saying, we will
    provide witnesses only as to those websites that you have
14
15
    identified in the preliminary contentions. It was only when we
    got into the depositions, which was after our meet and confer,
16
17
    that they started asking our witnesses questions about native
18
    mobile apps, and we objected saying, native mobile apps are not
19
    in the case, and that's how we -- we got here.
20
             But I -- so just to be clear, even in their 30(b)(6)
21
    notice, you will not find the word "native mobile apps," and
22
    you will actually find words limiting it to accused websites
23
    and describing the accused websites that are the subject of the
24
    30(b)(6) notice. So just to be clear on that.
25
             And with respect to the -- with respect to the
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    advertising documents, I mean, I think you get the sense from
    the conversation, I mean, we've just been asking for some way
 2
 3
    to narrow or focus what types of documents they're really
    looking for because telling me that they want all the documents
 4
    that say good things for their case doesn't really help me find
 5
    and make a request for my client.
 6
 7
             So, I mean, we've talked about maybe if there were
    specific kinds of reports or things like that that they can
 8
    identify -- that we can identify together, I mean, maybe I can
 9
10
    provide them some additional information. But I think they
    have what they need now with the promotional materials that
11
12
    we're producing, and obviously with respect to commercial
13
    success, they have all the revenue and usage numbers that they
    need for that.
14
15
             Thank you, Your Honor.
16
             THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Davis.
17
             We'll take a -- about a 10-minute recess now, and I'll
18
    come back. Thank you.
19
             LAW CLERK: All rise.
20
             (Recess.)
             LAW CLERK: All rise.
21
22
             THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated.
23
             With respect to the motion filed against How Stuff
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    Works, which is Document No. 128, that motion is denied.
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             The Court finds that under the circumstances there,
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
there was not an adequate way for the Defendant to know that the Plaintiff was accusing the systems that provide the audio podcasts. And accordingly, the Court does not find that they breached their obligations regarding discovery.

With respect to the motion against NBC, CBS, and the FOX entities, which is Document No. 131, while the Court believes it would have been preferable for the Plaintiff to have made clear earlier in the process that it considered that the native mobile apps were at issue in the matter, the Court does believe that under the circumstances of this case and given the technology involved, the Plaintiff is entitled to narrowly tailored discovery regarding the manner in which the native mobile apps function, consisting both of technical documents and a 30(b)(6) witness on that topic.

I'm going to ask the parties to meet and confer on that matter and to file an agreed order on Monday. To the extent it's agreed, obviously, that's all I need. To the extent that there are disagreements, I want each side to set out what it believes the limitations and the scope of that discovery should be. And I will enter an order promptly thereafter deciding that. But it is my intent that this be as focused as possible.

And I'm not making any judgment about what the effect of that discovery will be on the rest of the case, but I simply want to get that accomplished promptly.

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             Does either side have any questions about the rulings
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    that are --
 3
             MR. PITCOCK: No, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: All right.
 4
 5
             MR. SMITH: Not as to HSW, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: All right.
 6
 7
             MS. DAVIS: Your Honor, just one question. I assume,
   based on what you indicated, that we would not be getting into
 8
    the issue of damages documents with respect to the mobile apps
 9
10
    at this point, that we would just be focusing on the technical
    discovery to determine whether it's going to be an accused
11
12
    product?
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             THE COURT: That's what I'm focused on at this time.
14
             MR. PITCOCK: And, Your Honor, I guess just a
15
    follow-up on the requested discovery on advertising. I just
    wanted to know your -- Your Honor's ruling on that.
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17
             THE COURT: Well, I -- what I would like to see happen
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    on that is to see the -- that production made, and then if --
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    if you think there's other production you need, it sounds to me
20
    like Ms. Davis is open to conferring on that. If it's a matter
21
    you can't resolve, then you can bring it back up.
22
             MR. PITCOCK: Appreciate it, Your Honor.
23
             THE COURT: All right.
24
             MS. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor.
25
             THE COURT: Thank you.
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CERTIFICATION I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript from the stenographic notes of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my ability. SHELLY HOLMES Date Official Reporter State of Texas No.: 7804 Expiration Date: 12/31/14